Emergency Response, Public Health and Poison Control: Logical Linkages for Successful Risk Communication and Improved Disaster and Mass Incident Response by Yeager, Valerie A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2009-09-00
Emergency Response, Public Health
and Poison Control Logical Linkages for
Successful Risk Communication and
Improved Disaster and Mass Incident Response
Yeager, Valerie A.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Homeland Security Affairs (September 2009), v.5 no.3
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/25064
Emergency Response, Public Health and Poison Control: 
Logical Linkages for Successful Risk Communication and 
Improved Disaster and Mass Incident Response 
Valerie A. Yeager 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security established a broad mission 
to find ways to improve homeland security.1 In addition to preventing and 
mitigating disasters, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security 
highlighted the need to develop complimentary systems to avoid duplication and 
increase collaboration and coordination.2 Progress toward these objectives will 
ensure more effective responses to all hazards faced by Americans and contribute 
to the overall mission of improved security. This essay explores the possibilities 
of linking emergency response and public health with the poison control system 
for increased collaboration and coordination during disasters and emergencies. If 
successful, these linkages will ensure that we are more capable of effectively 
preventing, responding to, and recovering from disasters and emergencies. The 
provision of accurate public information and active surveillance, prevention of 
avoidable of surges in medical need, continuity of response operations, 
mitigation of public anxiety, and cost-savings for the health care system make 
Poison Control Centers a natural ally for disaster response agencies and public 
health.3  
Disasters and Emergencies Require Consistent and 
Accurate Public Information 
Recent natural disasters like Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, terrorist events such as 
the Oklahoma City Bombing and the events of 9/11, and public health incidents 
such as Salmonella and Escherichia coli (E. coli) outbreaks all required effective 
risk communication and safety guidance during and after the events.4 Currently, 
however, Americans do not have a consistent mechanism for the timely and 
repeated delivery of trustworthy public safety and health information.5 Most 
Americans rely on information translated through mass media before, during, 
and after a disaster or emergency incident; but the inherent flaw in this system is 
that we cannot ensure the consistent and accurate translation of crucial public 
safety and health information.  
As in most countries, Americans endeavor to discern between the factual and 
sensationalized information delivered through mass media. Additionally, people 
experiencing extreme anxiety or fear during a disaster or emergency incident will 
want assistance making health-related decisions, but the mass media cannot 
answer individual questions.6 When we experience extreme anxiety and fear, we 
seek reliable, trustworthy, and knowledgeable advice from respected individuals 
such as the police, the government, and medical professionals.7 This is inherently 
problematic during and immediately after disasters as there may be no direct 
connections to these agencies or officials. In most mass casualty and disaster 
events, these officials will be heavily taxed by the response to the event and will 
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likely be unable to handle the mass inquires and calls for personalized 
information and guidance.8 
In light of this dilemma and in response to the 2002 National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, there exists great potential to increase collaboration and 
coordination and utilize the well-developed infrastructure present in the poison 
control system.9 This system currently has the potential to provide for immediate, 
and consistent personalized public information during and after a disaster or 
emergency incident. The poison control network is well established. In its fifty-
five years of service it has become well known and trusted among the American 
public as a source of reliable information.  
Mitigating Unnecessary Medical Surges 
Public information is crucial during disasters and mass incidents. Efficient 
person-to-person information mitigates worry and potentially keeps people from 
rushing to an emergency room for answers.10 Fear and anxiety are mediated by 
information; therefore it is essential that we strive to find a mechanism to 
provide the public with a reliable system for receiving accurate and consistent 
information during a disaster or emergency incident.11  
A recent study highlighted the crucial role of adequate public health 
information during disasters and mass incidents.12 It found that the American 
public will indeed seek out protective information and guidance during a disaster 
or mass incident.13 If social distancing measures are implemented (requesting 
that individuals remain at home unless absolutely necessary) people will want a 
means to reach trusted health professionals from their homes. Without adequate 
and sometimes personalized information, people who are concerned that they 
may be ill or exposed to the infectious agent may go to an emergency department 
or physician’s office for reliable answers. Situations such as an infectious disease 
outbreak, especially with high-profile diseases like Avian or Pandemic Influenza, 
have great potential to overwhelm our medical system and create major obstacles 
to efficiently treating those in need of care.14 Additionally, those who have not 
been exposed, but are worried about being ill may actually be exposed to the 
infectious agent if unnecessarily visiting physicians and emergency departments.  
Active Surveillance Capabilities 
Poison control centers have the potential, if linked with public health and trained 
to handle public health related issues, to efficiently receive and respond to 
requests for public health information and guidance. They also have the systems 
and capabilities to perform active surveillance and reporting and can be utilized 
to screen and refer callers to appropriate facilities for medical screening and/or 
treatment.15   
In response to the 2006 radiological dispersal incident, an event of public 
health significance, Britain utilized their nurse-led, telephone system, the 
National Health System Direct (NHS Direct), to quell the fears of thousands of 
citizens who were unaware of the health risks of radiological exposure, unfamiliar 
with Polonium-210, or unsure of how or if they could have been exposed to 




HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
3 
Polonium-210.16 They also used this same telephone nurse system to screen 
potentially exposed individuals and refer those persons to appropriate centers for 
urine collection and analysis. NHS Direct was able to perform active surveillance 
during the incident. 
During the response to the intentional radiological dispersal incident, the 
Health Protection Agency, Britain’s equivalent of the United States’ Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, provided essential information both through the 
NHS Direct Internet site and the twenty-four-hour, nurse-staffed telephone help 
line. Within days of informing the public that Litvinenko died of an intentional 
radiological poisoning, NHS Direct received over 2,000 phone requests for 
information about exposure, side effects, and other concerns. In the next month, 
the number rose to a total of almost 4,000 calls about the incident.17  Imagine if 
these 4,000 callers had rushed to the nearest emergency department with their 
worries. The health system would not have been able to triage all of these 
thousands of people along with other unrelated emergency cases. The surge 
would have severely taxed the health care system and the laboratory network. 
The provision of personalized, adequate health information provided 
immeasurable benefits to the response efforts.  
NHS Direct also utilized a systematic approach to screen individuals for 
potential exposure based on the known information about the event and were 
subsequently able to refer this smaller group of nearly 800 people on for medical 
monitoring.18 The U.S. can utilize the poison control system in a manner similar 
to what was done in the Britain Litvinenko intentional dispersal event. Currently 
they are assisting in the response to the H1N1 outbreak. According to the 
National Poison Data System, between May 20th and August 13th, 2009, the U.S. 
poison control system fielded 392 calls from the public about H1N1.19 This is 
evidence that the U.S. public utilizes poison control centers as a resource for 
information about diverse health topics, not only poisonings.   
Existent Continuity of Operations Plans 
In addition to potentially reducing healthcare surge-capacity dilemmas and to 
providing active surveillance, poison control centers often have continuity of 
operations plans to ensure continuation of services in emergency or disaster 
situations. In order to receive federal funding, poison centers must meet the 
American Association of Poison Control Centers’ certification standards that 
include having mutual aid agreements for both local and national poison center 
partnerships for when call assistance is needed.  
For the most part, poison control centers have the autonomy to plan and train 
for emergencies and disasters as they deem appropriate. While exact statistics are 
unknown, many of the sixty poison centers are able to generate their own 
electricity to run computer systems and receive telephone calls should their 
region experience damaged infrastructure during a natural disaster or terrorist 
event. Additionally, some centers have plans for their nurses to telecommute if 
the disaster or event requires (and allows) it and, through a universal online 
information platform, they have the ability to receive immediate information 
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updates simultaneously across the sixty centers.20 While not all poison centers 
are currently able to access this platform online in real time, this resource is in 
development. In the meantime, email can be used to get consistent urgent 
response messages across all centers simultaneously. 
Handling Anxious and Fearful Callers 
Not only do poison control centers have the infrastructure and systems to receive 
calls and provide consistent, accurate information, they are also trained and 
experienced in communicating with anxious, worried callers. With appropriate 
situational information, poison control specialists can also field calls from 
worried and emotional callers during disasters and mass incidents. Certainly, 
these specialists can benefit from improved psychological first aid skills, but the 
foundation for this response exists. 
In the 2003 SARS outbreak in Toronto, Canada’s Telehealth system (another 
national, nurse-led telephone system) provided crucial support during an event 
that required strict social distancing measures and caused extreme and hyper-
vigilant fear among citizens. Prior to the outbreak, Telehealth fielded 
approximately 2,000 calls per day. During the event, nurses handled over 20,000 
calls per day.21 America’s existing poison control system has the infrastructure 
and the trained personnel to provide a similar response to calls for personalized, 
accurate and consistent risk communication during a disaster or emergency 
incident. While one regional center alone may not be able to handle all of the calls 
of a regional disaster such as the Toronto SARS outbreak, unanswered calls will 
roll to partner centers for additional support. It is also possible to forward calls to 
other centers as needed. In 2007, US poison control centers fielded over 4 million 
calls, averaging almost 12,000 calls per day as routine service.22 Some poison 
control centers are working to identify additional nurses to commit to training 
and assist as needed in an outbreak or other emergency or disaster-related event. 
In some cases, contingency plans include the assistance of retired nurses located 
through partnerships with state public health agencies. This is an example of one 
way poison centers and public health can plan and work together to increase 
preparedness and resiliency during a prolonged emergency or disaster.    
As a federalist nation founded on individual state autonomy, it is difficult to 
provide consistent messaging to the public in multiple states and regions when 
disasters and emergency incidents happen. The poison control system, as 
previously discussed, has the existing infrastructure to provide consistent 
messages to the poison control centers in all fifty states. With a universal access 
number, callers can easily reach their regional poison control center from 
anywhere in the U.S. If, for any reason, the regional phone lines are unavailable, 
the call will automatically roll to partner poison control centers. If there is a 
disaster affecting phone service in the region, poison centers will forward their 
calls to their national partners until the region regains service. They also have a 
language line for speaking with non-English speakers and telecommunication 
devices for the hearing or speech impaired.  
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An Example of a Successful Linkage 
The Georgia Poison Center has been collaborating with the state Department of 
Public Health for over a decade. They receive public health’s after-hours calls, 
provide guidance, and triage calls requiring direct connections to on-call public 
health officials. Georgia’s Department of Public Health contributes funding to the 
Georgia Poison Center to cover the cost of providing this service and for triaging 
all rabies calls.23 In addition to calls rolled from the Department of Public Health 
phone lines, the Georgia Poison Center has assisted callers during the 2004 fire 
that resulted in chemical releases around the city of Atlanta, and the closing of an 
area hospital and freeway. They field calls about unknown substances, such as 
during the white powder Anthrax incidents of 2001, and they handle food 
outbreak concerns and reports. Already, other poison control centers, as in 
Georgia, are working with public health to improve their response and recovery 
from incidents and outbreaks. It is essential to foster these and other 
relationships between poison centers, public health, and emergency response. In 
states where partnerships exist, the linkages necessary for improved all-hazards 
risk communication, response, and recovery will be developed with greater ease.  
Utilizing Existing Systems as Cost-Savings 
According to 1992 national data, the poison control system reduced annual 
medical spending by $355 million through cost avoidance by managing caller 
concerns and reducing the need for callers to attend emergency departments.24 
Similar cost savings may be possible for disaster and mass incident response and 
general assistance to public health departments. One possible challenge to 
developing these partnerships is that the increase in cost to the poison control 
centers must be supplemented with appropriate funding from federal or state 
governments or new partner organizations.   
Poison control centers continue to struggle to remain financially viable. They 
currently receive federal funding through the Poison Control Center 
Enhancement and Awareness Act but the appropriated amount can change 
depending on the federal budget. For most centers this federal funding does not 
provide enough support to cover their entire annual budget. Poison centers 
receive state funding as well, which means that year-to-year state budget cuts 
have the potential to have a negative impact on the future of some poison control 
centers. As a result of these funding inconsistencies, some poison control centers 
have utilized innovative mechanisms to ensure financial support. For example, in 
one state, all medical centers receiving assistance from poison centers provide 
supplemental funding to the state poison control system. Another state receives 
supplemental funding from tax structures such as long distance phone taxes. 
Useful partnerships between public health, emergency management, and 
homeland security have the potential to supplement the budgets of poison 
control systems while simultaneously providing benefits to the partner agencies 
and, perhaps most importantly, to the U.S. public in the form of improved 
homeland preparedness, response, and security.  








As we “strive to create a fully integrated national emergency response system that 
is adaptable to any terrorist attack, no matter how unlikely or catastrophic, as 
well as all manner of natural disasters,”25 it is natural that public health and 
emergency management partner with poison control centers and utilize the 
strong foundation present in the poison control infrastructure. Americans will 
expect forthcoming risk communication and it is necessary that we think through 
how we will field the many thousands of telephone calls, public inquires, and 
requests for guidance that may result for any number of hazards. Personalized 
information may be necessary to keep our other response and medical systems 
functioning efficiently; however, we need to ensure adequate and consistent 
messages. The poison control system can already do this, but we will need to 
overcome the potential barriers of obtaining buy-in for establishing partnerships 
among these agencies and increase funding for the already over-taxed poison 
control system so they expand their current training to include all-hazards 
preparedness and develop successful linkages with appropriate agencies.  
In response to the call for improved all hazards response, coordination and 
collaboration, it is vital that the department of homeland security, emergency 
management, public health, and the poison control system come to the table to 
begin these important discussions. Only then can we begin to address questions 
such as what is needed to promote consistent messaging, how many more people 
do we need to provide sufficient support for the call system in a national disaster 
or outbreak, and what are the weaknesses in our current telephone answering 
system and infrastructure? Until we have an evidence base that explains the 
opportunities that exist and the gaps we must fill to improve disaster and 
emergency response we are no further along toward improved security. 
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A Note from the Editors of Homeland Security Affairs: This essay was the winner of the 
2009 CHDS Essay Contest, which posed the question: What advice concerning 
Homeland Security would you give the next presidential administration and why? 
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